JOHN DEERE BULLDOZES PATENT COMPLAINT: HOW PLAINTIFFS PLED THEMSELVES OUT OF COURT WITH PREJUDICE

“In patent litigation, what you allege can and will be used against you. . . .”

I. INTRODUCTION

In patent litigation, the line between sufficient pleading and pleading yourself out of court can be razor thin. David’s Dozer V-Loc System Inc. and inventor David Armas (collectively, “plaintiffs”) learned this lesson the hard way when their detailed allegations—accepted as true—demonstrated that John Deere’s (“Deere”) products could not infringe their patent. On October 9, 2025, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Iowa dismissed all five counts of plaintiffs’ second amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) with prejudice—not because plaintiffs failed to allege enough, but because they alleged too much.

The case involved U.S. Patent No. 10,533,300 (“the ’300 patent”), titled “Automatic Grader Stabilizer,” which covers a method for controlling dozer blades. David’s Dozer V-Loc Sys. Inc. v. Deere & Co., No. 24-CV-1023-CJW-MAR (N.D. Iowa Oct. 9, 2025) (“David’s Dozer, slip op.”). Plaintiffs alleged that Deere and two of its customers named as co-defendants infringed the ’300 patent through use of Deere’s 333G SmartGrade Compact Track Loader and SmartGrade six-way dozer blade products (collectively, the “accused products”). Id. at 6-7. The claimed invention is directed to restricting the vertical movement of a dozer’s blade while engaged in grading operations.

The case began promisingly for plaintiffs. Their Complaint alleged that in August 2018, Armas demonstrated his patented system on a Deere vehicle at a tradeshow. See Second Amended Complaint, Dkt. 57 at 5-6 (“Complaint”). Months later, Deere filed four patent applications allegedly covering similar systems. Id. at 6. In 2020, Deere introduced the accused products featuring “Dozer Mode,” an automated precision grading feature that plaintiffs claimed infringed their patent.

But plaintiffs’ detailed allegations about how Dozer Mode actually operates became their undoing. The court found that plaintiffs’ own descriptions—gleaned from marketing statements and voltage tests—contradicted the method claimed in the ’300 Patent. As the court explained, the problem “is not that they included too few or insufficient facts to state a claim. The problem is that they included information that pleaded them out of Court.” David’s Dozer, slip op. at 40.

This one core failing toppled the entire case, resulting in dismissal of all five counts, like dominoes falling in a row.

II. THE TECHNOLOGY: WHAT THE ’300 PATENT ACTUALLY CLAIMS

Construction and excavation specialists use skid-steer vehicles with dozer blade attachments to create smooth surfaces for land improvements. The blade, mounted on the front of the vehicle, pushes dirt, rocks, and debris forward as the skid-steer moves. But conventionally engineered systems encountered a persistent problem. When passing over rocks, hard objects, or uneven terrain, the ground pushed the dozer blade upward off the surface, leaving an uneven grade wherever the blade rose. Id. at 5. Inventor Armas spent years developing improvements to address this problem, efforts that culminated in the ’300 patent, which issued on January 14, 2020.

The ’300 patent claims “[a] method for controlling a dozer blade controlled by an automatic grade control system on a skid steer vehicle.” The ’300 patent, col. 8 ll. 48-49. The patent’s key innovation involves preventing the blade from lifting by restricting the hydraulics that control the main arm connecting the blade to the vehicle. Specifically, independent claim 1’s fourth element recites “preventing the ability of the main arm from providing any lifting force by restricting the ability of a hydraulic that lifts the main arm.” Id. col. 8 ll. 47-67 (emphasis added).

The specification teaches three specific ways to accomplish this hydraulic restriction: (1) closing the valve that provides hydraulic pressure to the main arm hydraulic; (2) capping the supply or return hydraulic lines that feed the hydraulic; or (3) other hydraulic limiting means. Id. col. 5 ll. 36-45; col. 5 ll. 64-col. 6 ll. 6; col. 7 ll. 15-17. Each method involves directly manipulating the hydraulics themselves—cutting off pressure so the hydraulics cannot move the main arm. The specification explains that restricting the hydraulics “essentially neuters the ability of the main arm to move up under power of the hydraulic that could normally otherwise lift the main arm.” Id. col. 7 ll. 64-col. 8 ll. 2; col. 8 ll. 16-21. In plain terms, the ’300 patent keeps the blade down by cutting off hydraulic pressure so the main arm is locked in place and cannot lift.

Plaintiffs alleged that when Deere’s accused products operate in Dozer Mode, they infringe this patented method by “restrict[ing] the hydraulics which control the vehicle’s boom arm . . . such that the boom arm stays and remains in a lowered position.” Complaint at 7-8. As the court ultimately found, however, plaintiffs’ own detailed allegations about how Dozer Mode keeps the boom arm down fall outside the patent’s claim scope.

III. THE PLEADING TRAP: THREE FATAL ALLEGATIONS

The Federal Circuit has warned that “a patentee may subject its claims to early dismissal by pleading facts that are inconsistent with the requirements of its claims.” Bot M8 LLC v. Sony Corp. of Am., 4 F.4th 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Unlike typical Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals where plaintiffs fail to allege enough facts to satisfy the pleading requirements, Bot M8 dismissals occur when plaintiffs allege facts that affirmatively disprove their claims.

This is particularly problematic in patent cases because of the “all limitations” rule. To prove literal infringement, “every limitation set forth in a claim must be found in an accused product, exactly.” Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Tyco Healthcare Grp., LP, 616 F.3d 1249, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). When a plaintiff’s own allegations show the accused product lacks even one claim limitation, the complaint must be dismissed.

Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing plaintiffs’ allegations were “fundamentally inconsistent” with the ’300 patent’s claims. Dkt. 129-1 at 11-13. That fundamental inconsistency focused on plaintiffs’ allegations that the accused products practice the patent claims’ “restricting” limitation. Whether plaintiffs’ motion would succeed therefore depended on how the court would interpret “restricting.”

Plaintiffs urged the court to delay ruling on defendants’ motion until after the scheduled Markman hearing where the court would entertain the parties’ competing interpretations of disputed patent claim terms. Dkt. 131 at 8-11. But the court was persuaded otherwise, noting plaintiffs’ own conduct during the first step of Markman briefing. That first step obligated the parties to confer and identify disputed patent claim terms that required the court’s interpretation. Although the parties identified certain disputed claim terms, neither party proposed asking the court to construe the term “restricting” or the phrase “restricting the ability of a hydraulic that lifts the main arm.” Dkt. 137 at 2; David’s Dozer, slip op. at 13. The court therefore found little reason to defer action on defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion until after the Markman hearing.

According to the Federal Circuit, there is no “categorical rule against a district court’s adoption of a claim construction in adjudicating a motion to dismiss” when claim terms can be construed “based on intrinsic evidence alone.” UTTO Inc. v. Metrotech Corp., 119 F.4th 984, 992-93 (Fed. Cir. 2024). Where claims are construed based solely on the patent itself and its prosecution history—without extrinsic evidence—“a decision on claim construction is not different in kind from the interpretation of other legal standards, which is proper and routine in ruling on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6).” Id. at 993. Here, the court found it could construe the scope of the ’300 patent’s claims simply by reading the patent’s plain language and the detailed description in its specification. David’s Dozer, slip op. at 13-15.

The court’s intrinsic analysis concluded that the ’300 patent’s claimed method contemplates “directly restricting the hydraulics that lift the main arm.” Id. at 14. Each of the three specified methods—closing the valve, capping the lines, or other hydraulic limiting means—“involve an active step to directly manipulate the hydraulics.” Id. 

This meant that the patent claims require “restricting the ability of the hydraulics,” not restricting something else that indirectly affects the hydraulics. Id. As the court explained, “restricting the hydraulics, but not restricting something else, is what prevents the main arm from lifting.” Id. at 14-15. With this interpretation of what the ’300 patent requires, the court turned to plaintiffs’ allegations about how Dozer Mode works. Those allegations revealed three separate inconsistencies, each fatal to the infringement claim.

A. Allegation #1: Keeping the Blade Down “Hydraulically”

Plaintiffs’ first allegation quoted Deere’s product marketing manager, Gregg Zupancic, who appeared on a podcast and described Dozer Mode as “making sure that [the blade] is staying down onto the grade at all times, hydraulically.” Complaint at 8 (emphasis added). This allegation suggested that Dozer Mode uses hydraulics actively—engaging them to keep the blade down—rather than “restricting” them. The court found this allegation pointed toward active hydraulic engagement, which is inconsistent with the ’300 patent’s requirement of restricting hydraulic ability. David’s Dozer, slip op. at 17.

B. Allegation #2: Pulsing Hydraulics to Push the Blade Down

In a separate trade show interview, plaintiffs alleged Zupancic stated: “So with Dozer Mode . . . when the blade is wanting to come up off of the stops under heavy load, and we can pulse hydraulics to keep that down and push it down and keep it down so you get a nice smooth grade.” Complaint at 9. This allegation was even more problematic. Pulsing hydraulics to push the blade down requires actively engaging the hydraulics—precisely the opposite of restricting them. The contradiction could not be reconciled: “A device cannot restrict the hydraulics at the same time it is actively engaging the same hydraulics to apply a downward force. They are two opposite actions.” David’s Dozer, slip op. at 17.

C. Allegation #3: The Voltage Test Showing No Electrical Power

Plaintiffs also alleged they performed a voltage test on the accused products. When the vehicle operates in Dozer Mode, plaintiffs alleged there is “no voltage” measurable in the boom arm hydraulics. Complaint at 10. After the user pulls back on the joystick beyond a certain point, the vehicle disconnects from Dozer Mode, voltage becomes measurable, and the boom arm can lift. Id. Plaintiffs asserted this test “confirms when the [accused products are] operating in Dozer Mode . . . the hydraulics controlling the boom arm are indeed restricted.” Id.

The court rejected this assertion, finding that cutting electrical power is not the same as restricting hydraulic pressure:

Restricting power is not the same thing as restricting the hydraulics. According to the ’300 Patent, restricting the hydraulics requires closing the hydraulic valve line or capping the hydraulic supply. It does not require turning off the power supply. Stated differently, restricting the boom arm by turning off the power supply is a different method of keeping the boom arm in place than restricting the hydraulic pressure through the means specifically contemplated by the ’300 Patent.

Id. at 18. The court explained it is “likely power is needed to restrict the hydraulics by closing the valve and capping the hydraulic supply.” Id. In other words, the ’300 patent’s method of valve closure or line capping would require electrical power to operate the mechanisms that restrict hydraulic flow. By contrast, plaintiffs alleged Dozer Mode simply cuts power, which is “a different method than restricting the hydraulics.” Id.

D. A Closer Look: Claim Construction or Limitation Importation?

The court's construction of “restricting the ability of a hydraulic” raises a subtle but significant question. Did the court properly construe the claim language, or did it impermissibly import limitations from the patent’s specification?

Independent claim 1 recites “preventing the ability of the main arm from providing any lifting force by restricting the ability of a hydraulic that lifts the main arm. The ’300 patent, col. 8 ll. 47-67. The claim term “restricting” is not expressly limited to physical manipulation of hydraulic components. One could argue it broadly encompasses any method that prevents hydraulic operation—including cutting electrical power that drives the hydraulic system. Under this reading, plaintiffs’ voltage test would show the accused products restrict hydraulic operation, even if through a different mechanism than valve closure.

The court rejected this interpretation, holding that “restricting the hydraulics requires closing the hydraulic valve line or capping the hydraulic supply”—methods specifically described in the patent’s specification. David’s Dozer, slip op. at 18. Yet the Federal Circuit has cautioned against “importation of claim limitations from a few specification statements or figures into the claims.” Computer Docking Station Corp. v. Dell, Inc., 519 F.3d 1366, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The specification’s three examples (valve closure, line capping, other hydraulic limiting means) might be illustrative rather than exhaustive, particularly given the “other hydraulic limiting means” catch-all language.

The court’s construction appears sensitive to this catch-all by interpreting “restricting” as any direct manipulation of hydraulic flow, not just closing a valve or capping the hydraulic supply as discussed in the patent. But other indirect“hydraulic limiting means” are excluded. For support, the court emphasized the patent’s teaching that “restricting the ability of the hydraulic that lifts the main arm ‘essentially neuters the ability of the main arm to move up under power of the hydraulic that could normally otherwise lift the main arm.’” David’s Dozer, slip op. at 14-15 (quoting the ’300 patent, col. 7 ll. 64-col. 8 ll. 2).

According to the court, “restricting the hydraulics, but not restricting something else, is what prevents the main arm from lifting.” Id. But this interpretation of the “neuters” language invites scrutiny. The specification states that restricting the hydraulics “essentially neuters the ability of the main arm to move up under power of the hydraulic.” The ’300 patent, col. 7 ll. 64-col. 8 ll. 2 (emphasis added). One reading—the court’s—focuses on the object: the hydraulic itself must be restricted (valve closure, line capping, etc.). But an alternative reading focuses on the result: the main arm cannot move up under hydraulic power, regardless of the means by which that inability is achieved.

Under this second reading, cutting electrical power that drives the hydraulic system would “neuter the ability of the main arm to move up under power of the hydraulic” because without electricity, the hydraulic cannot generate power to lift the main arm. The specification’s language describes a functional outcome (no lifting under hydraulic power) rather than mandating a particular mechanism for achieving that outcome. If the claim construction question reaches the Federal Circuit, this ambiguity in the specification’s core teaching could prove dispositive.

Whether this construction would survive appellate review presents a closer question than the district court’s opinion might suggest. The court’s reading finds support in the specification’s repeated emphasis on direct hydraulic manipulation—closing valves, capping lines, and other means that physically restrict hydraulic flow. But plaintiffs could argue that “other hydraulic limiting means” encompasses any mechanism that prevents the hydraulic from lifting the main arm, including power interruption.

For plaintiffs’ counsel evaluating the merits of an appeal, this tension between broad claim language and specification-based narrowing could provide the strongest ground for reversal. Indeed, plaintiffs might leverage their appeal with Federal Circuit precedent favoring functional interpretations in method claims, arguing the specification’s examples are illustrative, not limiting. See, e.g., Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“improper to read a specific order of steps into method claims” where there is no disclaimer of step order).

These claim construction questions, while potentially significant on appeal, did not affect the district court’s ultimate ruling. With that core inconsistency in plaintiffs’ direct infringement allegations established by the court’s claim construction, all five counts fell in sequence.

IV. THE DOMINO EFFECT: HOW ONE ERROR COLLAPSED ALL FIVE COUNTS

Having found plaintiffs failed to allege direct infringement, the court turned to the remaining four counts. Each fell in sequence, like dominoes—or like a single thread pulling through the entire complaint, unraveling count after count.

A. Induced Infringement (Count II)

Plaintiffs’ second count alleged that Deere induced infringement in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). Complaint at 12. Under Section 271(b), “[w]hoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.” But induced infringement requires underlying direct infringement as a predicate. Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 572 U.S. 915, 924-25 (2014). Without direct infringement, there can be no induced infringement. David’s Dozer, slip op. at 26.

Notably, the court found that if direct infringement had been adequately pled, plaintiffs’ induced infringement allegations would have survived the motion to dismiss. Id. at 27-28. To prove induced infringement, a plaintiff must show “the alleged inducer knew of the patent, knowingly induced the infringing acts, and possessed a specific intent to encourage another’s infringement of the patent.” Vita-Mix Corp. v. Basic Holding, Inc., 581 F.3d 1317, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

Plaintiffs alleged specific instances where Zupancic’s statements on podcasts and at trade shows touted the advantages of using the accused products in the allegedly infringing manner. Complaint at 8-9. The court found these allegations, if true, sufficient to show “active steps to advertise and encourage an alleged infringing use.” David’s Dozer, slip op. at 28. This made the direct infringement failure even more consequential—plaintiffs came tantalizingly close on inducement, but the foundational requirement of pleading direct infringement was not satisfied.

B. Contributory Infringement (Count III)

Plaintiffs’ third count alleged Deere contributorily infringed under 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). Complaint at 13-14. “Contributory infringement occurs if a party sells or offers to sell, a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process” where the apparatus “is material to practicing the invention, has no substantial non-infringing uses, and is known by the party ‘to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent.’“ In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys. Pat. Litig., 681 F.3d 1323, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Like induced infringement, contributory infringement requires showing “there has been direct infringement.” Cross Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Thus, the absence of direct infringement doomed this count as well. David’s Dozer, slip op. at 29.

Even if direct infringement had been adequately pled, plaintiffs’ contributory infringement claim suffered from an independent defect. Plaintiffs failed to allege plausible facts showing the accused products “have no substantial non-infringing uses.” The complaint’s allegation that the accused products and their components “are substantial, material parts of the claimed inventions of the ’300 patent and have no substantial non-infringing use” was “nothing more than a formulaic recitation of the elements” without supporting facts. Id. at 30. And as another example of a self-defeating allegation, the complaint elsewhere alleged that Dozer Mode is “one of” the prominent features of the accused products, suggesting the products have other important non-infringing features. Complaint at 7. The court determined that this allegation “directly undermines plaintiffs’ argument that the accused products do not have any substantial non-infringing uses.” David’s Dozer, slip op. at 30.

C. False Advertising (Count IV)

Plaintiffs’ fourth count alleged Deere engaged in false and misleading advertising in violation of Section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B). Complaint at 15-16. Plaintiffs pled this claim in the alternative to their infringement claims: if Deere doesn’t infringe because Dozer Mode doesn’t actually restrict hydraulics, then Zupancic’s marketing statements about how Dozer Mode works must constitute false advertising.

The theory had surface appeal but failed for two independent reasons. First, Zupancic’s statements did not claim Dozer Mode “restricts” hydraulics. He said it works “hydraulically” and “pulses” to keep the blade down—statements that, as the court found in dismissing the infringement claims, describe active hydraulic engagement rather than restriction. David’s Dozer, slip op. at 33. The court found that “Zupancic did not falsely claim Dozer Mode restricted the hydraulics because that is simply not what he said.” Id. Second, plaintiffs failed to allege concrete injury with factual support. The complaint alleged only that plaintiffs “have been irreparably harmed” and suffered “business reputation, related declining sales, or loss of goodwill.” Complaint at 16. The use of “or” suggested plaintiffs themselves didn’t know which injury they suffered, and no facts supported any specific harm. David’s Dozer, slip op. at 33-34. Without plausible injury allegations, plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue the Lanham Act claim. Id. at 34.

D. Correction of Inventorship (Count V)

Plaintiffs’ fifth count sought correction of inventorship under 35 U.S.C. § 256, asking the court to add plaintiff Armas as a joint inventor on the four patents Deere filed after the August 2018 trade show. Complaint at 17. Joint inventorship requires more than contribution to conception—it requires “some element of joint behavior, such as collaboration or working under common direction.” Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co., 973 F.2d 911, 917 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The Federal Circuit has explained that “[c]ollaboration or concerted effort can only occur when the inventors have some open line of communication during or in temporal proximity to their inventive efforts.” Eli Lilly & Co. v. Aradigm Corp., 376 F.3d 1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

Plaintiffs alleged Armas demonstrated his system at a trade show, and months later Deere filed patent applications covering similar technology. Complaint at 5-6. But plaintiffs alleged no communication, coordination, or connection between Armas and Deere’s inventors. The complaint suggested Deere representatives might have observed the demonstration but alleged no interaction beyond that passive viewing. The court held this insufficient: “Even if defendants saw the ’300 patent’s method in use, simply viewing the method is not enough to show a connection or collaboration.” David’s Dozer, slip op. at 37. Joint inventorship “requires at least some quantum of collaboration or connection,” which was entirely absent from the complaint. Id. (quoting Eli Lilly, 376 F.3d at 1359).

V. PROCEDURAL AFTERMATH: FINALITY FOR ALL DEFENDANTS

A. The Customer-Suit Exception

Though ultimately mooted by dismissal of the entire complaint, Deere had also moved to dismiss—or alternatively to sever and stay—claims against dealer defendants Dobbs Equipment, LLC and EFE, Inc. d/b/a Everglades Equipment Group. Dkt. 129-1 at 13-14. Deere argued these dealers were merely its customers, and therefore the customer-suit exception should apply to protect them from litigation burdens while the claims against the true defendant, Deere, proceeded.

The Federal Circuit recognizes that district courts have discretion to stay or sever patent infringement claims against customers when the manufacturer is the “true defendant” in the dispute. In re Nintendo of Am., Inc., 756 F.3d 1363, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2014). This customer-suit exception traditionally applied when a patent holder sued a customer in one court and the manufacturer then sued for declaratory judgment in another court. But Nintendo extended the doctrine to single-action cases, holding courts can sever claims against customers while claims against the manufacturer proceed if “the manufacturer's liability is a predicate to recovery for any of the other defendants.” Id. at 1366.

Plaintiffs resisted severance with an argument that, while uncommon, has gained traction in recent customer-suit cases. They argued the exception shouldn’t apply to patent method claims because manufacturers and customers might infringe through different activities, meaning resolution against the manufacturer wouldn’t necessarily resolve claims against customers. David's Dozer, slip op. at 21. Courts have increasingly recognized this distinction. See, e.g., Erfindergemeinschaft UroPep GbR v. Eli Lilly & Co., Case No. 2:15-CV-1202-WCB (E.D. Tex. Apr 26, 2016) (“no suggestion that Cialis infringes [the patent] ‘off the shelf’”) (citing cases). The argument has doctrinal appeal—with apparatus claims, a customer’s use of a manufacturer’s infringing product creates automatic derivative liability, but with method claims, a customer might perform the patented method in ways distinct from the manufacturer’s acts of making, selling, or promoting the apparatus.

The court found this argument legally sound but factually inapplicable. Plaintiffs asserted no separate theory of infringement against the dealer defendants—“no substantive allegations the Dealer Defendants infringed in any way distinct from the Deere Defendants.” David's Dozer, slip op. at 22. The dealers allegedly infringed only by selling the accused products, not by performing the patented method themselves or in a manner different from the manufacturer. Because the infringement theories were identical, the customer-suit exception’s rationale—avoiding duplicative litigation against customers when the manufacturer is the real party in interest—applied equally to the method claims at issue in the case. Id.at 21-22.

The court’s analysis clarifies an important doctrinal boundary. The relevant question is not claim type but infringement theory distinctness. Where a customer is alleged to infringe derivatively through the same acts as the manufacturer (selling accused products that practice the method), method claims are treated no differently than apparatus claims. Where a customer is alleged to independently perform a patented method in ways distinct from the manufacturer’s activities—for instance, using sold equipment to perform process steps the manufacturer never performed or instructed—the method-claim argument might preclude severance.

Here, plaintiffs’ failure to allege any independent method performance by the dealers foreclosed their resistance to severance. As courts continue to refine the customer-suit doctrine's boundaries, this distinction between derivative and independent method performance may become increasingly significant.

The court ultimately declined to sever on different grounds, the law-of-the-case doctrine. The procedural history explains why this issue arose. Plaintiffs originally sued only Deere in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Dkt. 1. After Deere moved to transfer venue to the Northern District of Iowa—Deere’s principal place of business and where the accused products were designed and manufactured—plaintiffs amended their complaint to add the two Florida-based dealer defendants. Dkt. 30-31, 37. The strategic calculus was apparent. Adding Florida defendants might defeat venue transfer by creating a stronger connection to Florida. But the tactic failed. Deere and the newly added dealer defendants jointly moved to transfer the case to Iowa and to sever and stay claims against the dealers. Dkt. 70. The Southern District of Florida granted the transfer motion, finding Iowa was the more convenient forum, but denied the severance motion, holding the case could “‘proceed in its entirety in the Northern District of Iowa.’” David's Dozer, slip op. at 22 (quoting Dkt. 89, at 18-19).

After the case transferred to Iowa, defendants renewed their severance motion. But the Northern District of Iowa found itself bound by the Southern District of Florida’s earlier decision under the law-of-the-case doctrine. Under this doctrine, “when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.” Morris v. American Nat'l Can Corp., 988 F.2d 50, 52 (8th Cir. 1993). A court may revisit a prior decision only in “extraordinary circumstances” where the initial decision was “clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.” Id. The Iowa court found no such circumstances—defendants raised essentially the same arguments they had raised in Florida, and there was no new evidence warranting reconsideration. David's Dozer, slip op. at 22-23.

Thus, even if the direct infringement claim had survived, the dealer defendants would have remained in the case. As it turned out, defendants’ failure to achieve severance proved a blessing in disguise—by keeping all defendants in the case, the law-of-the-case ruling enabled the court to dispose of claims against manufacturers and dealers alike in a single dismissal with prejudice.

B. With Prejudice: No Third Chances

Having determined that all five counts must be dismissed, the court addressed whether dismissal should be with or without prejudice. Dismissal with prejudice may be appropriate if amending the pleadings would be futile or if plaintiffs have not indicated how they would make the complaint viable. Pet Quarters, Inc. v. Depository Tr. & Clearing Corp., 559 F.3d 772, 782 (8th Cir. 2009).

Plaintiffs argued they should be allowed to amend their complaint because the prior amendments addressed only “technicalities”—first adding dealer defendants and an additional cause of action, then correcting a defendant’s identity. Dkt. 131 at 24-25. This was the first time a court had tested the sufficiency of their substantive allegations. But the court found that amendment would be futile:

[T]he problem with plaintiffs’ second amended complaint here is not that they included too few or insufficient facts to state a claim. The problem is that they included information that pleaded them out of Court. . . . Their allegations already show how the Accused Products work and that it is inconsistent with how the ’300 patent works. The Court does not see how amending their complaint could resolve the inconsistencies unless plaintiffs revise their entire understanding of how the Accused Products work and their interpretations of the comments Zupancic made and then also revise their factual allegations to support the changes.

David’s Dozer, slip op. at 40. The court noted that plaintiffs had notice of the possible substantive deficiencies since at least March 1, 2024, when defendants first moved to dismiss in the Southern District of Florida before the case was transferred. Id. at 39. Yet throughout briefing, oral argument, and months of litigation, plaintiffs “have not come up with anything else, or at least they have not informed the Court of anything else they believe would make their complaint viable.” Id. at 40. “Plaintiffs’ conclusory argument” that they should get another chance “is not a sufficient ground for the Court to grant leave for plaintiffs to amend their complaint again.” Id.

The court dismissed the second amended complaint with prejudice, closing the case.

VI. CONCLUSION: PULLING THE SINGLE THREAD

A garment unravels when a single thread is pulled. David’s Dozer’s second amended complaint unraveled the same way—substantive inconsistency between the ’300 patent’s claimed method and the alleged operation of Dozer Mode doomed every count. The case spotlights the treacherous terrain between Twombly’s sufficiency requirements and Bot M8’s over-pleading trap: plaintiffs must plead enough detail to satisfy plausibility without providing so much detail they disprove infringement. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007); Bot M8 LLC v. Sony Corp. of Am., 4 F.4th 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2021).

The case also reveals a critical procedural misstep. Plaintiffs argued for a Markman hearing to construe “restricting,” but they hadn’t proposed construction of that term in pre-motion exchanges. Id. at 13. This allowed the court to proceed with intrinsic construction at the motion to dismiss stage under UTTO Inc. v. Metrotech Corp., 119 F.4th 984, 992-93 (Fed. Cir. 2024). David’s Dozer joins Bot M8 and UTTO as part of a broader trend. Courts are increasingly willing to engage in preliminary claim construction when intrinsic evidence provides clear guidance for the court’s interpretation of claim terms, making the motion to dismiss stage a consequential battlefield in patent litigation.

Patent plaintiffs can no longer count on surviving through fact discovery based on formulaic recitations—the complaint must tell a plausible story consistent with the patent’s claim limitations, tested against the specification’s detailed description. Yet the core problem here wasn’t formulaic pleading— it was that plaintiffs alleged Dozer Mode uses a different method than the ’300 patent claims. The lesson is sobering. In patent litigation, what you allege can and will be held against you. And a single loose thread, pulled tight, can unravel your whole case.